October 16, 2025
The NCAA’s $2.8 billion settlement in House v. NCAA marks a seismic shift in college athletics. For decades, the NCAA has denied college athletes the right to earn any money from their participation in sports, arguing that doing so would undermine the “amateurism” model of college athletics even as it raked in massive revenue—$1 billion annually from “March Madness” alone. Accepting a slice of pizza or a ride to the airport from a coach could be deemed to be an impermissible “extra benefit,” and college athletes could not be paid a dime on their “name, image, and likeness” (NIL) from video games while all other involved parties profited. The House settlement, reached because of massive damages that the association faced from lawsuits related to price-fixing for college athletes under the antitrust laws that threatened its very existence, changed the landscape completely. Schools can now share up to $20.5 million of their annual athletic revenue from media rights, ticket sales, and sponsorships with athletes. Caps on athletic scholarships are gone, replaced by new roster limits that can deprive even current athletes of places on their team. The settlement provides a damage stream of $2.7 billion in back payments to former athletes from 2016 to 2024 who were denied the right to earn money for their NIL. Intended to put antitrust liability behind and usher in a new era of athlete compensation and transparency, the settlement has instead triggered new controversies over its fairness and legality.
First, concerns over gender equity loom over the settlement. Retroactive damages allocate 90% of the $2.7 billion to football and men’s basketball and just 5% to women’s basketball, leaving the remaining 5% for all other sports. Female athletes have appealed the settlement based on these statistics, and other athletes have challenged the calculation of their back-pay awards. Judge Claudia Wilken, who approved the landmark settlement on June 6, 2025, deemed House to be an antitrust—not a Title IX—case and left open future challenges to those disbursements.
Second, the roster limits are a minefield. Eliminating the scholarship caps and replacing them with roster limits—with a “grandfathering” clause for current athletes—will curtail opportunities for “walk-on” and partial-scholarship athletes and jeopardize non-revenue sports. Even the “grandfathering” provision for current athletes lacks teeth as it is purely discretionary from the schools’ perspectives.
Third, the settlement’s restrictions on NIL deals and their heavy regulatory oversight threaten to undermine the very autonomy and contract rights that the settlement was supposed to provide to the athletes. The settlement creates a new for-profit entity—the College Sports Commission—which has been given broad power to impose penalties for violations of the settlement. For NIL deals, the settlement creates a new NIL “clearinghouse” operated by Deloitte, a global accounting and consulting firm, to vet athlete’s sponsorship and endorsement deals for validation of their business purpose and fair market value through a platform called “NIL Go.” There are serious questions of confidentiality and the right of athletes to contract privately with third-party sponsors. This NIL approval process already has generated legislative blowback. Oregon recently passed a bill preventing forced disclosure of NIL contract terms, and New Jersey passed similar legislation in May prohibiting punishment of athletes or schools who violate the new NIL rules. Existing laws in California, Nebraska and several other states conflict squarely with terms of the House settlement on NIL. Prospects for a uniform, national NIL law consistent with the settlement seem dim in the current political climate. A dozen bills have been introduced in Congress, but none have made it out of committee.
Fourth, critics argue that the settlement operates “like a union” without actual player representation. Which raises another issue that could pose an even greater existential threat to the NCAA, its conferences, and its member schools: the classification of paid athletes as “employees.” Last year, the Third Circuit in Johnson v. NCAA allowed a case to go forward which made that very allegation. Advocates argue that the control exercised over the athletes by the settlement and new contracts for revenue-sharing and NIL deals constitute disguised employment agreements. “Employee” status would entitle athletes to federal minimum wage, overtime, unemployment compensation and other benefits, and could itself have Title IX implications. More relevant to the House settlement, it could undermine some of its key terms.
While the House settlement finally lays to rest the NCAA’s discredited amateurism model, it substitutes a regulatory framework whose future hinges on gender equity litigation, athlete agency, and future labor decisions. It may collapse under its own internal conflicts. Only time will tell if this settlement has staying power and if it is a true win for college sports.