{"id":2473,"date":"2024-12-14T03:49:41","date_gmt":"2024-12-14T03:49:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/law.temple.edu\/ilit\/?p=2473"},"modified":"2026-01-22T17:36:33","modified_gmt":"2026-01-22T17:36:33","slug":"a-victims-perspective-on-international-law-in-cyberspace","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.temple.edu\/ilit\/a-victims-perspective-on-international-law-in-cyberspace\/","title":{"rendered":"A Victim\u2019s Perspective on International Law in Cyberspace"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Chris Carpenter<\/a>, Duncan B. Hollis<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica\u2019s recent position paper improves transparency on the country\u2019s legal views and provides a framework for future dialogue with other states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the spring of 2022, two significant ransomware operations<\/a> targeted 27 Costa Rican government bodies, in addition to the country\u2019s health care system. Costa Rica\u2019s government refused to pay the ransom<\/a> demanded. In light of the hackers\u2019 threats to leak sensitive information from the data they encrypted, many government-run systems had to be taken offline (including those related to tax collection, medicine, and social security). Costa Rica\u2019s president, Rodrigo Chaves, declared that Costa Rica was \u201cat war\u201d with the attackers (who were affiliated with two Russian-language-speaking groups, known as Conti and Hive). The Costa Rican government has spent the last year working on recovery and remediation, with technical assistance from state governments (namely, the United States<\/a> and Spain<\/a>) and industry<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In light of these events, it is unsurprising that Costa Rica just released one of the most robust position papers<\/a> on the applicability of international law in cyberspace. In doing so, it becomes (by our count) the 36th state to offer an official national position on the subject. Thus, Costa Rica joins a trend\u2014though not yet a large sample\u2014in which states appear increasingly interested in improving transparency on their respective legal views and providing a framework for future dialogue (and, perhaps, agreement).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica\u2019s statement tracks the vast majority of its predecessors in acknowledging the applicability of international law \u201cin its entirety\u201d to information and communication technologies (ICTs), including the prohibition on the use of force and international humanitarian law (IHL). It tackles many of the same topics covered in other states\u2019 national statements\u2014such as nonintervention, sovereignty, countermeasures, and due diligence\u2014while raising others that have not received as much attention\u2014including human rights, peaceful settlement of disputes, and neutrality. Costa Rica has clearly spent time examining other states\u2019 statements and, in particular, \u201cacademic projects on the application of international law to cyber operations\u201d including the Oxford Process<\/a> (for which one of us is a co-convenor), the Tallinn Manuals<\/a>, and the Cyberlaw Toolkit<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Temple University Law School\u2019s Institute for Law, Innovation, and Technology<\/a>, known as iLIT, has been working in conjunction with American University\u2019s Tech, Law, and Security program<\/a> to catalog and analyze the three dozen existing national statements on the application of international law. We were thus pleased to see Costa Rica\u2019s elaborate statement. It provides an opportunity not only to engage with Costa Rica\u2019s novel contributions but also to evaluate the overall state of play on the operation of international law in cyberspace. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovereignty <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica joins the majority of states that have addressed the topic of sovereignty (including Brazil<\/a>, Canada<\/a>, Japan<\/a>, and, most recently, Ireland<\/a>) by categorizing it as a rule that can be breached by other states\u2019 cyber operations. In doing so, Costa Rica\u2019s statement further isolates the United Kingdom<\/a>\u2014which has doubled-down on the idea<\/a> that sovereignty is better thought of as a background principle informing other rules<\/a>, noting that it \u201cdoes not consider that the general concept of sovereignty by itself provides a sufficient or clear basis for extrapolating a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber conduct.\u201d  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What cyber operations will violate sovereignty? Here, too, Costa Rica\u2019s statement<\/a> reaches widely, including not only physical attacks but also cyber operations that trigger a \u201closs of functionality of cyber infrastructure located in the victim State.\u201d This position makes sense given the nonphysical (but extensive) economic damage Costa Rica suffered in the 2022 ransomware attacks. Similarly, Costa Rica includes an \u201cusurpation of inherently governmental functions\u201d as a violation of sovereignty, tracking the Tallinn Manual 2.0<\/a>, and including operations \u201cinterfering with a State\u2019s democratic processes, such as elections, responses to a national security or health emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and its choice of foreign policy.\u201d Costa Rica\u2019s position differs from the statement immediately preceding its own (from Ireland<\/a>) that had not recognized usurpation of governmental functions as a sovereignty violating condition.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where Costa Rica really separates itself from other states is in its willingness to envision violations of state sovereignty via cyber espionage. To be clear, Costa Rica recognizes that \u201cit is often difficult to technically distinguish between a mere data-gathering operation from an operation penetrating a governmental system in order to interfere with a State\u2019s sovereign functions. Real-world examples show that, once a piece of malware successfully enters a system or network, it remains a latent threat to its integrity.\u201d But rather than default to a position allowing espionage, given the difficulty in making such distinctions, Costa Rica\u2019s statement cuts in the other direction, suggesting that at least some surveillance operations and cyber espionage can be conducted in a manner that breaches state sovereignty and other rules of international law. As such, Costa Rica stands apart from many other states\u2014Germany<\/a>, Japan<\/a>, Poland<\/a>, and Israel<\/a>, to name a few\u2014that declined to expressly tie surveillance operations to potential violations of state sovereignty. In fact, Costa Rica is the first state to adopt this position in such clear and unequivocal terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nonintervention<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica\u2019s position, like most of the other national statements, relies on the 1986 International Court of Justice case Nicaragua v. United States<\/em><\/a> and the UN General Assembly\u2019s Friendly Relations Declaration<\/a> to identify a prohibition on intervention that includes behavior below the use-of-force threshold, which involves coercive interference in another state\u2019s domestic affairs (the domaine r\u00e9serv\u00e9<\/em>). As with sovereignty, Costa Rica is again expansive in its reading of what conduct will violate this obligation, including \u201cransomware attacks crippling or simply interfering with a State\u2019s ability to run public services, such as finance, education, and social security.\u201d Relying on the Tallinn Manual 2.0<\/a>, Costa Rica suggests an intervention can also occur \u201cwhen [a State] engages in or supports subversive or hostile propaganda or the dissemination of false news that interfere in the internal or external affairs of another State\u201d and (joining New Zealand<\/a>, Australia<\/a>, Brazil<\/a>, and others) \u201cforeign election interference.\u201d Thus, Costa Rica breaks ahead of the pack in suggesting that the principle of nonintervention can be applied as a tool to respond to state-sponsored mis- and disinformation campaigns. Furthermore, in Costa Rica\u2019s view, the attempted cyber intervention does not need to be successful in order to violate this principle\u2014intent to coerce is sufficient. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Countermeasures<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Countermeasures involve otherwise internationally wrongful conduct whose wrongfulness is precluded when done in response to a prior internationally wrongful act (and various other substantive and process conditions are satisfied). Costa Rica\u2019s statement acknowledges the substantive and procedural constraints articulated by the UN International Law Commission<\/a> (for example, that countermeasures must not be punitive, must be proportionate, and must not disrupt fundamental human rights). At the same time, Costa Rica\u2019s position acknowledges that the procedural requirements\u2014namely (a) summation (calling on the state to cease its wrongful acts), (b) notice to that state of the intention to take countermeasures, and (c) the offer to negotiate\u2014\u201cdo not have to be met when compliance with them would defeat the purpose of the intended countermeasures.\u201d Other states have opined on exceptions to procedural requirements, albeit in slightly different terms (such as Italy<\/a>, France<\/a>, Netherlands<\/a>, and Norway<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

More importantly, Costa Rica\u2019s statement<\/a> weighs in (positively) on the possibility of states employing countermeasures collectively<\/em>, a position championed originally by Estonia<\/a> and supported more recently by Ireland<\/a>. Costa Rica\u2019s statement signals support for the idea of collective countermeasures not only for violations of obligations erga omnes <\/em>but also at the request of a victim state. In contrast, states such as France<\/a> and Canada<\/a> have suggested collective countermeasures are not permitted by international law at present, while Brazil<\/a> has poured cold water on the idea of countermeasures in general.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Due Diligence<\/strong>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. has notably declined to endorse the idea of due diligence as a rule of international law governing cyberspace, supporting it as a \u201cvoluntary\u201d norm instead in the influential 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts Report<\/a>. Costa Rica, in contrast, comes out strongly supporting due diligence as a standard that manifests across at least four different areas of international law<\/a>. Thus, Costa Rica cites due diligence as including the Corfu Channel<\/a> standard (a state is \u201cnot to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States\u201d), with constructive notice being possible where a state \u201cknows or should have known\u201d that the act contrary to the rights of other states \u201coriginates from or transits through its territory.\u201d Costa Rica, moreover, takes the position that states \u201cmust exercise a reasonable degree of vigilance over their networks\u201d and \u201cmust also put in place certain basic protective measures\u201d over their cyber infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Costa Rica looks beyond Corfuto tie its vision of the due diligence obligation to taking \u201cappropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm\u201d (independent of whether that harm violates the rights of other states). Previously, this reading of due diligence has mostly been applied to international environmental law in the context of pollution (for example, in Trail Smelter<\/em><\/a>, where an arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of U.S. claims that Canada should bear responsibility for pollution caused by smoke from the smelter on the Canadian side of the border that drifted downwind into Washington state, causing harm to crops and forests there). Here, Costa Rica cites the application of due diligence<\/a> in the cyberspace context as covering \u201cnon-physical harms \u2026 including those caused through or to ICTs,\u201d such as \u201conline incitement to violence, hostility or discrimination and disinformation campaigns causing harm to individuals.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

International Humanitarian Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica\u2019s position on the applicability of international humanitarian law in cyberspace<\/a> is one of the most detailed, nuanced, and wide ranging of those disseminated thus far. The statement describes in detail how IHL applies to cyber operations as a part of ongoing armed conflicts, and where a cyber operation has the ability to commence an armed conflict on its own. It takes the time, moreover, to walk through the application of the core IHL principles. Regarding the principle of distinction, for example, Costa Rica adopts the position that, \u201c[w]ith respect to cyber infrastructure, the assessment of whether an object qualifies as a military objective must be done at the lowest level practically possible,\u201d by which it means, \u201cat the level of each particular computer, cable, router, or other specific device that can be separated from a network or a system as a whole.\u201d Cyberattacks (for purposes of the prohibition of attacks on civilians or civilian objects) involve conduct \u201cdesigned or [that] can be reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects,\u201d alongside:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

The disabling\u2014temporary or permanent, reversible or not\u2014of the targeted computer, system, or network. For the avoidance of doubt, this means that the existence of physical damage to objects or injury or death to persons is not required<\/em> for an operation to constitute an attack under IHL. (Emphasis added.)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The implications of this position are significant. A number of other states have been reluctant to treat a loss of functionality alone as an attack (some states, such as Poland<\/a>, simply do not include loss of functionality as an attack, while other states, such as Canada<\/a>, Germany<\/a>, and Israel<\/a>, are much more qualifying in their language). These qualifiers matter, since only \u201cattacks\u201d trigger IHL fundamental principles like distinction and proportionality. If an operation is not an attack, the argument goes, there is no need to discriminate among civilian and military objects. If, however, a loss of functionality can, as Costa Rica submits, comprise an attack, it widens the aperture significantly as to which cyber operations will be attacks that trigger the principle of distinction. From this position, Costa Rica returns to its own situation, asserting that the kind of ransomware attack it suffered in 2022 \u201cwould be considered an attack under IHL and therefore must not be directed against civilian systems.\u201d  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, Costa Rica takes a position long advocated by the International Committee of the Red C<\/a>ross, but that few (if any) states have endorsed previously: the idea of data as an object. Costa Rica takes the view<\/a> that \u201ccivilian data constitute civilian objects under IHL,\u201d reasoning that, \u201c[b]efore the digital revolution, such data was stored in the form of paper files that were protected under IHL. Therefore, in Costa Rica\u2019s view, the protection of civilian objects under IHL extends to civilian data.\u201d This means that \u201c[c]ivilian datasets, including medical data, social security data, tax records, corporate and financial data, or electoral lists,\u201d are all considered unlawful targets under IHL that cannot be attacked without violating the principle of distinction.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human Rights<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like other states, Costa Rica asserts that human rights apply online the same way they do offline. It also repeatedly highlights the gendered impact of cyber harms, noting that women have suffered disproportionately from cyber harms (from electronic surveillance to hate speech to doxxing to cyber bullying to harassment). Where its statement is likely to engender the most controversy is in where<\/em> these obligations apply. The U.S., for example, has long contended<\/a> that its human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) apply only within U.S. territory\u2014that is, it has no obligation to respect human rights outside its territory. Costa Rica\u2019s position can be said to occupy the opposite pole. It claims that a state\u2019s obligations to respect, protect, and ensure human rights under the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights go beyond:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

[A] State\u2019s territory, areas, or persons under its physical control. It extends to all human rights over whose enjoyment the State exercises power or effective control, regardless of physical proximity. This means that, under those treaties, States must respect, protect and ensure human rights that are exercised online or via ICTs and over whose enjoyment a State exercises effective control. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This position may align with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights<\/a>, but it is not one many states have endorsed themselves. Hence, it will be interesting to gauge other states\u2019 reactions to Costa Rica\u2019s position on where online states must afford human rights protections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costa Rica\u2019s statement<\/a> appears to be the longest and most sophisticated national statement issued to date on the application of international law in cyberspace. Although not traditionally recognized as a cyber power in either a military or an industrial sense, Costa Rica\u2019s experiences with ransomware may elevate its voice among the dozens of states now speaking out on how to achieve global governance for states\u2019 online behaviors. Of course, this is no guarantee that Costa Rica\u2019s positions will set a new standard for others, whether in requiring states that have already spoken out to update their more cursory existing statements or in providing a proof of concept for other states that have yet to issue any statements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Costa Rica\u2019s position paper highlights just how much priority many states are now affording the role of international law online. The question of what to make of these statements themselves also warrants more attention. How do these national statements relate to international law\u2014what legal relevance do they have if, as states generally assert, existing rules already apply? Are they merely efforts at interpretation and application, or do they go further by serving as evidence of some new opinio juris <\/em>and evolving the law\u2019s content in the process? As Russia and others call for a cybersecurity treaty<\/a>, it may be particularly important to look to these statements as a signal on those areas where consensus appears most likely, and those where positions diverge (often quite substantially), suggesting that further clarifications and dialogues are sorely needed.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duncan B. Hollis is Laura H. Carnell Professor of Law at Temple University Law School. He recently co-edited Defending Democracies: Combating Foreign Election Interference in a Digital Age (Oxford University Press, 2021) and is editor of the award-winning Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2nd, ed., 2020). He regularly writes on issues of international law, norms, and global cybersecurity. Professor Hollis is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an elected member of the American Law Institute, and a regular consultant for the Microsoft Corporation’s Digital Diplomacy team.<\/sub><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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Hollis Costa Rica\u2019s recent position paper improves transparency on the country\u2019s legal views and provides…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":54,"featured_media":2914,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kad_post_transparent":"","_kad_post_title":"","_kad_post_layout":"","_kad_post_sidebar_id":"","_kad_post_content_style":"","_kad_post_vertical_padding":"","_kad_post_feature":"","_kad_post_feature_position":"","_kad_post_header":false,"_kad_post_footer":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[32],"tags":[80,79,68,78],"class_list":["post-2473","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","tag-cybersecurity","tag-human-rights","tag-international-law","tag-sovereignty"],"yoast_head":"\nA Victim\u2019s Perspective on International Law in Cyberspace - Temple iLIT<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/law.temple.edu\/ilit\/a-victims-perspective-on-international-law-in-cyberspace\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A Victim\u2019s Perspective on International Law in Cyberspace - Temple iLIT\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Chris Carpenter, Duncan B. 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