BY GRANT ROST<\/p>\n
A few nights ago, I came across my daughter reading The Fellowship of the Ring.\u00a0 She\u2019s a voracious reader, but this was really her first full-fledged effort with Tolkien.\u00a0 I noticed she was nearing the end of the book.\u00a0 I inquired on how it was going.\u00a0 \u201cUgh. I just want to be done,\u201d she said.\u00a0 When I asked why, she told me that the book was moving too slowly for her\u2014the writing too thick, too cumbersome in spots.\u00a0 \u201cI\u2019m interested in the story,\u201d she said, \u201cbut I just want to get back to the kind of books I like.\u201d\u00a0 She just turned 12 about a minute ago, so perhaps we can forgive her for wanting to toss Frodo and Sam to the Nazg\u00fbl.\u00a0 She thoroughly enjoyed the movies, thankfully.\u00a0 You and I, however, aren\u2019t so far off from where she is.\u00a0 We also prefer simpler stories at times.\u00a0 This is particularly true when we receive a complicated story as an explanation that follows our simple question.\u00a0 \u201cI just didn\u2019t do it\u201d is a preferable explanation over some long tale about one\u2019s canine masticating previously written and completed work that was assigned for effortful exertion to take place at one\u2019s homestead on the day prior. \u00a0Who needs all of that?\u00a0 As lawyers, we usually appreciate the ruthless efficiency of a simple explanation.\u00a0 However, as trial lawyers, we aren\u2019t often so good at offering simple stories for the sake of simple explanations.<\/p>\n
That brings me to a study hot off the November presses.\u00a0 It involves 7 experiments, among a host of others preceding them, to further explore the human preference for simplicity.\u00a0 Our friend and colleague, Justin Berstein, has long attributed the Giza pyramid of trophies his mock trial teams are building to UCLA\u2019s practice of paring down case packets to the most digestible stories that come from them.\u00a0 He\u2019s carved those building blocks with Occam\u2019s razor, shaving off peripheral pieces of evidence and the unnecessary pounds of thicker theories.[1]<\/a>\u00a0 As litigators and coaches, it\u2019s worth meditating on this study to learn more about why simplicity seems to be our brain\u2019s default preference.<\/p>\n This study is comprised of 7 different experiments and each experiment is fairly involved.\u00a0 I could summarize each experiment and make this blog longer than anyone would want it to be.\u00a0 Instead, I will summarize the themes running through the 7 experiments and discuss some of the findings that would be important for litigators or coaches.\u00a0 It\u2019s important to note here that the study attempts to add another layer of explanation to the well-proven fact that our brains gravitate toward simplicity.\u00a0 Toward simplicity in explanation, certainly.\u00a0 While we might all like to hear Stephen Hawking explain the mysteries of black holes to us, most of us would prefer a 5-minute Ted talk on it as opposed to a 2-hour lecture.\u00a0 However, the authors of the study set out to prove whether our preference for simplicity might also arise from a desire to complete goals in efficient ways.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 For our present purpose, it seems a worthwhile question to ask: How might a juror\u2019s goal-directed search for an explanatory verdict be led by a desire to complete that goal efficiently?<\/p>\n The authors summarize their methods as follows:<\/p>\n \u2026we had participants read about simple and complex methods for producing an outcome. In one condition, the outcome had already been produced and participants made retrospective judgments about which explanation was more appealing.\u00a0 But in another condition, the outcome had not yet been produced, and participants instead made prospective judgments about which method would be a more appealing way of producing [the outcome].[3]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In a few of the experiments, the authors not only position explanation of past phenomena against methods for producing the same outcome prospectively, they also introduced probability data for explanation conditions and the process conditions.\u00a0 I\u2019ll share some of their test questions to better illustrate the experiments.\u00a0 The following was from their first experiment, which didn\u2019t involve a probability component:<\/p>\n Gozo flies are usually gray. But they turn purple if they eat certain minerals.<\/p>\n They turn purple if they eat both alion and balion.<\/p>\n They also turn purple if they eat calion.<\/p>\n Participants then answered a test question, which varied across two between-subject conditions. In the flies version of the explanation condition, participants were asked:<\/p>\n You are trying to understand why a certain Gozo fly is purple. What is the most appealing explanation for why it is purple?<\/p>\n (Forced choice: It ate alion and balion; It ate calion).<\/p>\n In the process condition, participants were asked:<\/p>\n You want to cause a certain Gozo fly to turn purple. What is the most appealing way to make it turn purple?<\/p>\n (Forced choice: Feed it alion and balion; Feed it calion).[4]<\/a><\/p>\n The following is from one of the explanation conditions which included probability data:<\/p>\n Tulver rocks are typically gray and smooth. But they become purple and rough if they are exposed to certain molecules.<\/p>\n If they are exposed to ancon, they become purple 90% of the time.<\/p>\n If they are exposed to bancon, they become rough 90% of the time.<\/p>\n If they are exposed to cancon, they become purple and rough 65% of the time.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n So, the authors of the study predicted that test subjects would show similar preferences when it came to explanations for an outcome and for prospectively producing that outcome later. \u00a0Using the first example above, that would mean test subjects were predicted to choose the explanation for a Gozo fly\u2019s purpleness as resulting from it having eaten \u201ccalion\u201d and to likewise choose to feed it \u201ccalion\u201d in order to turn it purple.[6]<\/a> \u00a0Thus, if the simple explanation is preferable, the simple process would be preferable as well. \u00a0However, the experiments were more sophisticated than I can spell out in the small space of this blog.\u00a0 Part of this sophistication involved experiments which tied preferences to efficient goal completion and not merely to a preference for simplicity.<\/p>\n The authors conclude the study, saying:<\/p>\n We suggest that in both judgments, preferences for simplicity reflect a tendency to prefer accomplishing goals efficiently. With explanations, the goal is to describe what caused an outcome, and so it is more efficient to invoke fewer causal factors.\u00a0 With processes, the goal is to produce an outcome, and so it is more efficient to use fewer causal factors.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n However, in the experiments where probability data was introduced, things didn\u2019t always follow the lines of simplicity.\u00a0 The authors found that test subjects were willing to \u201cviolate\u201d Occam\u2019s razor and multiply causes when certain kinds of probability data were present.\u00a0 So, for instance, if test subjects heard a simple cause produced an effect 65% of the time but that a complex set of causes produced the same outcome 80% or 90% of the time, the subjects were more likely to choose both the complex explanation of the outcome and the complex process for producing the outcome.[8]<\/a>\u00a0 The higher probability had more explanatory and productive power than the simpler, but less-likely operations.<\/p>\n It\u2019s probably true that we\u2019ve thought that our cases, our theories, and our arguments need to be as simple as the evidence allows.\u00a0 I\u2019m sure we\u2019ve linked that simplicity to the idea of plausibility\u2014believing that jurors will find both the simplest and most plausible explanation for a \u201ccase event\u201d to be the right version of the case event.\u00a0 Apart from a juror seeking an explanation, however, it seems to be worth pondering whether our evidence, jury instructions, verdict forms\u2014and our arguments about all of these things\u2014lend themselves toward a preference for an efficient, goal-oriented process.<\/p>\n As we always do this time of year, Jules and I wish you and your loved ones a happy, healthy, and safe holiday season.\u00a0 We will see you in the new year!<\/p>\n <\/p>\n —————————<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Occam\u2019s razor is a philosophical tool attributed to the work of William of Ockham, a 14th<\/sup> century theologian and author.\u00a0 Jody Foster\u2019s character in the 1997 alien movie \u201cContact\u201d popularly summarized the principle, saying, \u201cAll things being equal, the simplest explanation tends to be the right one.\u201d\u00a0 However, a still-usable and more precise definition would probably go something like this:\u00a0 When trying to explain a single event or phenomena, it is not necessary to multiply causes or contributing factors, because one should pursue simpler explanations first.\u00a0 To put that another, simpler way, Occam\u2019s razor should be used to shave away complicating causes in favor of finding the simplest plausible explanation.\u00a0 The tool is discretionary and prescriptive, however, and not exactly hard science.\u00a0 To that end, Foster\u2019s character says that the simplest explanations \u201ctend to be\u201d right, rather than saying that they are always right.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Claudia G. Sehl et al., Doing things efficiently: Testing an account of why simple explanations are satisfying, 154 Cognitive Psychology 101692, November, 2024, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cogpsych.2024.101692<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 2.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 3.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 8.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> See<\/em> id. <\/em>at 2.<\/p>\n